Changes
in the Wind
Russia,
regardless of the ideology in vogue at the time, has always operated
on a pragmatic level. Even in the Soviet era, western analysts –
and foreign Communists – were blindsided by the deals struck with
the Anti-Comintern force of Nazi Germany, regardless of the cold,
harsh logic behind the decision. This was not a decision based upon
ideology, or backwardness, or barbarity, but a situation – an
event. The West had pursued a policy of appeasement towards Germany,
and Russia saw their enemies moving toward them. Space had to be
made, and time had to be bought. This example is one of many. A
factor that should be calculated into the analysis of Russian foreign
policy is its unpredictability in the face of specific events that
makes the nation feel threatened, where Russia will act with what it
deems most pragmatic, given the situation. Russian foreign policy in
the post-Soviet era has been largely reactionary to perceived threats
by the United States, particularly through NATO, and terrorism. Two
particular time periods deserve examination in post-Soviet Russia:
the early to late 90s, during which the dominant force shifted from
Westernism to Statism, and Putin's radical shift back and forth
between Statism as well as Westernism in the face of Chechen
terrorism and US policies.
The
seemingly sudden end to radical Westernism in Russia was accelerated
by changes in both administration and sudden entanglements, and not
merely a slow erosion (64). Russia, initially intoxicated by radical
Westernism, was met with a barrage of issues that threatened its
power. United Nations intervention in the Balkans was dramatically
opposed by parliament, and NATO's swallowing up of former Soviet bloc
members allowed for mobilization against the Westernists in Russia –
a trend that would continue (66). To chalk this up to some sort of
formula of a combination of inescapable economic backwardness and a
distinct separation from the West is a gross oversimplification and
borderline ignorant of the facts on the ground. Russia, under
westernization, had gone as far as abandoning its traditional
“shatter zone” with the complete disregard of some former
territories and former Soviet Republics. Russia felt threatened –
and one is most unpredictable when backed into a corner, especially
in a relative democracy. Kozyrev, Boris Yeltisn's foreign minister,
had been the most important driving force behind westernization. With
nationalist victories in the 1993 and 1995 elections, Yeltsin made
the conscious decision to wildly modify his policy by removing
Koryzev and appointing Primakov, who signaled the abandonment of
Westernism and the adoption of Statism (65). The appointment was a
cold calculation against the growing nationalist power in Russia.
Still, even Primakov was not yet opposed so much to NATO expansion
and instead pushed for a more multipolar world. To say that relations
merely “worsened” with the West with NATO's airstrikes in the
Balkans in 1999 is an understatement. NATO's rampant expansionism set
the stage for Russia in the 21st century (103). For better or worse,
Russia found itself poised once more as a counterbalance to the West,
though not on the bipolar level of the Cold War, and Statist Russia
quickly allied itself with nonwestern powers in an attempt at
ensuring a power balance.
Much
of Russia's foreign policy has been reactionary to how the United
States acts. The Chechen War in 1999 has had a lasting effect on
Russia, beyond the obvious tension. Much like how Americans united
around Bush in the aftermath of 9-11, so too did Russians around
Putin, who was a greatly unpopular prime minister (103). Putin was
quite friendly to western interests in the aftermath of 9-11, sharing
with them a mutual concern regarding terrorism. Russia had been
plagued with terrorism since 1999, and Putin saw this as more of a
threat to Russian security than conventional warfare between states
(105). Another event in the United States' continuation of the war on
terror ultimately put the two powers at odds, once more – the
invasion of Iraq. The United States had acted unilaterally,
completing going over the head of the United Nations unlike the
earlier airstrikes at the turn of the century (143). This boiled into
three separate fears: a US policy of regime change, internal
revolutions, and radicalization of Muslims through a perceived clash
of civilizations. Russia perceives the continued expansion of NATO as
a threat of a military bloc right on its border. Russia also blames
the “colored revolutions” as being orchestrated by the United
States, and took steps to expunge “foreign agents” from Russia,
including even the Peace Corps.
Russia
is no longer quite as bound by ideology as it once had been,
particularly under the Soviet era. Russia operates in an incredibly
pragmatic manner, twisting and turning to worm its way through the
obstacles that it finds itself within. These often result in longterm
policy changes, as a direct result of experience, drastically
changing the political landscape of the country. “Persistent
factors” are not so persistent; reducing Russian foreign policy to
a formula will often leave an analyst surprised and dumbfounded.
Russia's attempts at westernization were derailed by sharp, painful
situations, and terrorism's influence on the country is third only
perhaps to Israel and the United States. It is important to keep an
eye on Russia's approach to foreign policy in the brewing turmoil
within the Middle East, especially given their feelings of being
“duped” by the United Nations with regards to Libya – and now
they stand flatly opposing interventionism in Syria.
Works
Cited
Tsygankov,
Andrei P. Russia's
Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity.
2nd ed. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010. Print.
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