17 Mar. 2014
Policy Brief: Russia's International Approach to the Central Asian Drug Problem
Russia has a vested interest in combating the illegal drug trade. As there is neither political will nor an existing framework for decriminalization or legalization in international law, and as demand-side security has proven ineffective, a supply-side approach must be undertaken. With the United States' Afghanistan draw-down, their absence will both complicate and open up possibilities of combating the Central Asian drug market at its source. Russia must involve the international community, including the United States, if it is to be successful. This is contingent upon the domestic willingness of key Russian figures, such President Putin, Viktor Ivanov, and the whole of the Federal Drug Control Service of Russia
What can the Federal Drug Control Service (FDSC) of the Russian Federation do in Russia's “near abroad” to combat the illegal drug trade – and how can the international community be convinced to approve?
One of the most prevalent issues of destabilization in Central Asia is its illicit drug trade, the essential shadow economy of Central Asia. The illicit drug trade perpetuates corruption and may help fund terrorism – though certainly funds the ruling elites, weakening the state and negatively affecting legitimate growth.1 Of course, this also complicates reform. Still, repressing the illicit drug trade may be more politically tenable than other investments. The United States, Russia, and indeed the United Nations, has a public face of being highly dedicated to continuing the drug war with a prohibitionist stance. Drug use has been an enormous public health crisis in both Russia and Central Asia, along with creating issues of security through criminality.
The majority of drugs are trafficked through Turkmenistan and roughly half through Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. From Tajikistan, the drugs continue to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Through Uzbekistan, drugs are trafficked into Russia as well as the Caucasus via Kazakhstan. In recent years, Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan have moved from simply a transit country into a market for drugs from Afghanistan, as well as into its own production of opium, ephedra, and cannabis. It is estimated that 30% of Afghan-produced opiates find their way into Western Europe, with 60% moving into Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Afghanistan accounts for 88% of the world’s opium production.
Prevalence of Use:
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates the total number of opiate users in the combined Central Asian regions being between 3.4 and 3.8 million people. Illicit drug use represents a public health hazard, beyond the addictive nature of opiates. Hepatitis C and HIV, given injection methods of opiate and stimulant use, spread rapidly.2 There is an estimated HIV prevalence among intravenous drug users from 7% in Kyrgyzstan, 4% in Kazakhstan, and 16% in Uzbekistan as well as Tajikistan.
This prevalence is higher dependent on subregion. For example, 2% in Bishkek, to 13% in Osh. These rates have been on the rise.3 In western Siberia, there has been a 700% increase in the rate of HIV infections, theorized to be mostly amongst intravenous drug users. Younger individuals have been the most affected. In Uzbekistan, 8413 (64%) of 13,146 HIV cases have been among people aged 34 years or younger.4 Beyond public health, the criminal aspects of the drug problem are enormous.
The Criminal Element:
According to Aleksandr Zelitchenko, a retired Kyrgyz police colonel and coordinator for the European Union’s Central Asian Drug Action Program in Kyrgyzstan, corruption poses a greater risk than the public health crisis. Although the extent of the drug problem is mostly measured in drug seizures, the records are unreliable. Measures of yield have been historically off, and even Turkmenistan has not provided data on seizures since 2000. In Kyrgyzstan, Zelitchenko estimates that the actual number of illicit drug users is probably around 100,000.5 In addition to seizure data, one can conclude that drug-related criminal activity is growing worse through an examination of how drug-related crimes feature.
Kairat Osmonaliev states, “…in the early 1990s, each 23rd crime was related to drugs, but by the end of the 1990s, each 10th crime registered was directly related to illegal drug circulation.” Organized crime is steadily increasing. Central Asia’s corruption and reliance on clientele socio-political forms of interaction do not help in this; low legal salaries give rise to the temptation to take cuts of the enormous profits of the drug business. For example, the Department Head of the DCA in Zaravshan Valley was arrested with 30 kg of heroin in 2004. Even worse, the Tajik ambassador to Kazakhstan was caught twice transporting drugs, including 62 kg of heroin.6 Although these drug syndicates have not yet grown in comparable power to South American counterparts, this may actually complicate enforcement through a small chain of distributors.
Central Asian leaders are keen to link Islamic terrorism with the drug trade, in part legitimized by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s drug trade involvement in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan before 2001. According to Sebastian Peyrouse, however, the baseline linkage between terrorism and drugs is “based on a very simplistic reading of the Afghan situation.” A lack of profitable crops outside of poppy fields complicates the situation in Afghanistan, coupled with “warlords and patronage mechanisms.” In addition to the exaggeration of the link between Islamic terrorism and the drug trade, Central Asian states also tend to paint themselves as victims of an Afghanistan “spillover”, diverting attention from their own responsibility.
Statement of Interest:
Russia cannot hope to combat the illegal drug trade with a purely domestic focus. Russia has the largest population of injecting drug users in the world, estimated at 1.8 million, and 90% of them are estimated to have hepatitis C. Each year, drug use reportedly kills 70,000 people. Prosecution of drug offenders costs one-hundred million annually, with an astonishing thirty-five billion leaving the country in what is theorized to be drug-related money laundering.7 The problem must be attacked at transit points and at the supply source, in Russia's “near abroad.” The Federal Drug Control Service, working with foreign agencies, may be able to accomplish this. Previously, Victor Ivanov and President Putin have shown a willingness for supply-side initiatives, but have had their ideas complicated by NATO/US policies in Central Asia. With the post 2014 Afghanistan drawdown, this may now be more tenable. In addition to stemming the crisis at home, the secondary effect of stabilizing Central Asian countries will be an added benefit for Russia.
CAEC, the Central Asian Organization for Economic Cooperation, attempted to include discussions on regional security, particularly which of drug control. Within CAEC, the IDCC – the Interstate Drug Control Commission – was formed. However, IDCC has done little more than provide lip service to the idea of enforcement, with little in the way of real results.8 To focus on all of the domestic problems with Central Asia’s drug enforcement is beyond the scope of this paper, but they deserve mention as they are inextricably linked. Nevertheless, Central Asian states have been shown to act on combating the drug trade under international pressure, giving foreign policy a voice in encouraging compliance.9
Domestic Drug Enforcement Reform
The political will, internationally, does not yet exist for mass drug legalization, nor does the framework presently exist in international law.10, 11 Even with some exceptions such as minor incidences of decriminalization and legalization, the most important figure in efforts to combat Central Asia's drug trade – Vladimir Putin – has expressed skepticism. “We consider it essential to fight all kinds of drugs. We observe with concern the relaxation in laws by some countries moving towards the legalization of so-called soft drugs,” Putin said at the annual International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC).12
Although the Central Asian states have adopted virtually every major narcotics treaty, most efforts at international pressure have been conducted bilaterally. There has been a significant missed opportunity in dealing multilaterally and involving the international community in combating the Central Asian drug issue, representative of the over politicization of the issue. With the drawdown in Afghanistan, there are fears that dealing with the supply side of the issue will now be significantly more difficult, in spite of US claims to the contrary. Russian attempts at convincing NATO and the UN Security Council to act against Afghan drug production were unsuccessful. One such plan, dubbed “Rainbow-2”, would have been a large scale poppy eradication program, partnering CSTO with NATO, in addition to UN sanctions on Afghan landowners who authorize the cultivation of opium.13 According to Viktor Ivanov, director of the Federal Drug Control Service in Russia, stated that he believed “a joint operation… by NATO and CSTO wherein CSTO could focus upon the transit states and NATO would have to destroy the poppy fields in Afghanistan…. would be accomplished in a week.”14
NATO refused, fearing that this would worsen the image of the organization in Afghanistan, along with a lack of alternative sources of revenue for Afghan farmers. This attempt at hitting the focal point of supply remains Russia’s objective.15 Contrariwise, a plan known as CACI, the Central Asian Counternarcotics Initiative, seeks to build support for law enforcement agencies by establishing counternarcotics task forces in each of the five Central Asian countries, communicating across boundaries.
Then-assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement affairs, William Brownfield, stated to RFE/RL that the plan would help in preventing a boost in the flow of opium poppy after the 2014 drawdown in military power. The plan would have been funded by the State Department, purchasing equipment and paying for training. However, the plan is essentially dead in the water.16 According to Elena Chernenko, writing for Kommersant, unlike the plan of attacking supply directly Moscow was less than enthusiastic about CACI, and it felt that the plan was little more than a cover for the US to increase their footprint in Central Asia.
This fear of US-Central Asian bilateral talks is not a new one. In addition, Russian diplomats have raised the valid concern that CACI does nothing to actually solve problems of corruption in law enforcement. According to a February 2012 report by RFE/RL, CACI has not been “rejected” but “blocked.” Ultimately, the US wants to deal with the drug problem by attacking demand in Central Asia, but Russia wants to deal with supply in Afghanistan. Both want the other’s help, but both have very differing strategies.17 This is an example of Russian fears – whether legitimate or not – of the United States attempting to circumvent Russia’s geopolitical influence.
Although there may be hope with the European Union improving relations with the Central Asian republics, they have traditionally had a distant relationship.18 Obviously, the bilateral nature of CACI did not help to alleviate these fears. As Aleksandr Zelitchenko recommended, Russia has a vested interest – more than the United States – in combatting narcotics. Not involving CSTO, thus, is an immediate mistake. Dealing unilaterally instead of regionally and involving interested powers, as well as neighbors, is a mistake. Having a narrow focus on security measures rather than attacking the problem at the source of demand is costly, and may be less effective.
- Solving Porous Borders:
Establish border checkpoints, offer Russian forces to complement Central Asian domestic forces. Fund and train anti-drug task forces for border control.
- Feasible. It has been done in the past, and Central Asian states are willing to acquiesce.
- Not politically controversial abroad.
- Keeps the relations between Russia and Central Asia.
- Does not necessarily involve direct contact with Afghanistan.
- Unlikely to resolve the issue. Although Central Asian states are willing to acquiesce, actual enforcement lacks will – even Russian forces have fallen prey to widespread corruption.
- The borders are simply too large.
- Politically controversial at home. Russian politicians are skeptical of past attempts such as CACI.
- Securing porous borders is not as simple as establishing a few checkpoints with barbed wire. Writes Peyrouse, “Every entry into Central Asian territory can be negotiated (by buying a false passport, bribing a border guard to forgo a document check, and so on).” It requires political will to secure the borders – a will that is substantially lacking.
- Afghanistan-centric, law-enforcement approach
Attack the drug supply at its source: Afghanistan. Involve international law enforcement agencies and domestic Afghanistan agencies directly, with FDCS agents present in Afghanistan.
- Poppy fields are not hard to destroy, and not easy to hide.
- International actors are very willing for a law-enforcement approach.
- With the US drawdown, it is more likely NATO will cooperate, especially given EU interest in combating drugs – however, the EU has typically done this from a “boots on the ground” law-enforcement approach done cooperatively with Afghanistan domestic agencies.
- Law-enforcement approaches have had some success in the past, but the operations have typically been too bilateral.
- The bigger the operation, the harder and more expensive it is to coordinate. Still, intelligence sharing is a vital operation.
- Afghanistan remains an incredibly dangerous and volatile region.
- Most, if not all, opium production is in Taliban controlled areas .
- International cooperation is seen by many in Russia as giving foreign powers a “footprint”, hence the earlier pressure on Central Asian states to reject the US-backed CACI plan.
- Afghanistan-centric, military approach
Attack the drug supply at its source: Afghanistan. Use limited, precision military force against drug operations.
- Does not necessarily require “boots on the ground.”
- Does not necessitate Afghanistan domestic involvement or even necessarily approval.
- Whether an operation is in a Taliban controlled area or not becomes irrelevant.
- Poppy fields are the beginning of the chain.
- The political will for both renewed and limited NATO or CSTO military action does not exist in Afghanistan domestically, and Russia has routinely criticized the US in recent years for unauthorized drone attacks abroad. If a poppy field operation was to have civilian casualties, this would interfere with Russia's rhetoric.
- Destroying poppy fields was highly unpopular for US forces, hence its eventual ceasing.
- Putting military “boots on the ground” in Afghanistan would be nigh unthinkable given the Soviet history.
- Buying off poppy farmers has not been previously effective, and was tried by NATO.
- Given years of operation, there is most likely already such a large stockpile of opium that poppy field destruction would not have an immediate effect.
- Enormously expensive, especially if military action is performed only by CSTO.
- Drug Policy Reform
Through decriminalization, medical treatment, or legalization domestically, the situation in both Russia and Central Asia could be improved and demand curtailed, thus lowering supply in the long run in Afghanistan. At bare minimum, the punitive model should be reserved for traffickers.
- The medical model has been shown to be extremely effective in treating drug addicts, such as use of opiate substitution therapy.
- Comparatively, the medical model costs far less than the punitive model.
- Decriminalization in Portugal reduced the usage of “hard drugs.”
- Legalization is typically considered to be a violation of international law.
- There is absolutely no political will outside of Kyrgyzstan even for the medical model of treatment. Although it exists to some extent in Russia, opioid substitution therapy is not permitted.
- Drug use is a “moral issue” and difficult to confront politically.
A multi-tiered, Afghanistan-centric law enforcement approach: stricter punishments for drug traffickers and corrupt officials, and international law-enforcement efforts in Afghanistan.
Ultimately, there is no single action that will resolve the drug crisis. However, the least controversial and most effective approach to date has been punishing drug traffickers themselves rather than users, and law-enforcement efforts in Afghanistan. The European Union and the United States have already shown a willingness for law enforcement acts, and if these can be coordinated with Russia's FDCS, they may have larger successes.
Military action in terms of destroying poppy fields is most likely unfeasible at this point, even without US presence. Still, their absence and murky policies may do more to help than harm international drug-control efforts. The US prefers to act unilaterally.19 Russia has traditionally criticized or pressured Central Asian states to reject plans that do not involve Russia at the helm.
While it may be within Russia's interests to prevent too large of a footprint of specific powers, there is a far greater cost in allowing the drug trade to continue than the theoretical “footprint” of foreign powers. International players must also show a willingness to involve Russia, perhaps even at the helm, given that Russia suffers from the problem of the Central Asian drug trade the most. Concession will be required on both sides.
Activist Post. “UN Drug Czar: States Can’t Legalize Marijuana Under International Law.” Activist Post. 21 Nov. 2012. <http://www.activistpost.com/2012/11/un-drug-czar-states-cant-legalize.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.
A slightly biased secondary source examining UN policy towards legalization movements and UN International Narcotics Control Board president Raymond Yans' letter concerning how legalization violates international law. The original press release is no longer available as a primary source from the INCB.
Blank, Stephen. “AWOL: U.S. Policy in Central Asia.” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. 30 Oct. 2013. <http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12848-awol-us-policy-in-central-asia.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.
Stephen Blank examines how US policy typically judges Central Asia for its failures while failing to directly engage.
Brunnstrom, David. “NATO Rejects Russian Call for Afghan Drug Removal.” Reuters. 24 Mar. 2010. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/24/idUSLDE62N1YZ>. 8 Mar. 2014.
David Brunnstorm reports on NATO's refusal of the Rainbow-2 plan. He also notes that, given stockpiles of opium, destroying poppy fields may make little initial impact.
Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy. “Drug Traffic from Afghanistan as a Threat to European Security.” Parliamentary Assembly – Council of Europe. 24 Sep. 2013. <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=19717&lang=en>. 8 Mar. 2014.
A report from the EU Parliamentary Assembly detailing how drugs from Afghanistan are a threat to European security, how the international community has failed to stemmed the tide, and offering suggestions of domestic law-enforcement measures in Afghanistan.
Doward, Jamie. “Leaked Paper Reveals UN Split Over war on Drugs.” The Guardian. 30 Nov. 2013. <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/nov/30/un-drugs-policy-split-leaked-paper>. 8 Mar. 2014.
Jamie Doward reports on a leaked UN draft document showing Latin America's difference in opinion with the present prohibitionist policies of the UN, and the intense internal disagreement.
DrugWarFacts.org. “International – Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Abstracts and statistics from other studies).”Common Sense for Drug Policy. http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/?q=node/1111#sthash.1eYFzkkM.dpbs>. 8 Mar. 2014.
DrugWarFacts is a secondary-source compendium of statistics from primary sources.
EEAS. “First EU-Central Asia Security Dialogue…” European Union. 13 June 2013. <http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/14062013_eu_central_asia_secdial_en.htm>. 8 Mar. 2014.
A brief press release by the European Union on security dialogue between EU and Central Asian representatives. Very sparse in actual details.
Fergana International Information Agency. “Viktor Ivanov...“ Ferghana.news. 3 May 2012. <http://enews.fergananews.com/news.php?id=2246>. 8 Mar. 2014.
A news article detailing the Rainbow-2 plan, with Viktor Ivanov's comments to Kommersant newspaper translated on the success of joint-law enforcement activities, but NATO's unwillingness to take military action.
Guneev, Sergei. “Putin Criticizes States Legalizing Soft Drugs.” RIA-NOVOSTI. 5 Jun. 2013. <http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130605/181522078.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.
Sergei Guneev reports on Putin's critique of the trend of legalization of so-called “soft drugs.”
Krambs, Timothy. “Drug Control in Central Asia.” Foreign Military Studies Office. U.S. Army. http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/FAO/Drug-Control-Central-Asia.pdf.> 8 Mar. 2014.
A heavily detailed intelligence report by Timothy Krambs on drug control in Central Asia and its logistics.
Luong, Pauline and Erika Weinthal. “New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia.” Foreign Affairs. March/April 2002. Web. <http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Political_Science/OLD/pauline/New%20Friends%20New%20Fears.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.
A report detailing the sudden and briefly warm relationships between Central Asian countries and the United States that arose in the Afghanistan conflict, and initial reactions to their human rights abuses.
Mankoff, Jeffrey. “The United States and Central Asia after 2014.” CSIS. January 2013. Web. <http://csis.org/files/publication/130122_Mankoff_USCentralAsia_Web.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.
Jeffrey Mankoff explains how the United States' policy to Central Asia has always been short-sighted, and that there is not a coherent post-Afghanistan plan.
Osmonaliev, Kairat. “Developing Counter-Narcotics Policy in Central Asia.” Silk Road Studies. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. January 2005. <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/Silkroadpapers/Osmonaliev.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.
Osmanaliev's report is an enormous intelligence research paper detailing the post-Soviet problem of the drug war, and at the time how US forces were approaching it. It is dated as it was written in 2005.
Paul, T.V. “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy.” International Security. 2005, 30.1. The MIT Press. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.stetson.edu:2048/stable/4137458>. 8 Mar. 2014.
Paul's article describes how the US has typically acted unilaterally in security issues, rather than waiting or even approaching the international community, given its primacy.
Peyrouse, Sebastien. “Drug Trafficking in Central Asia.” PONARS Eurasia. Sep 2012. <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pepm_218_Peyrouse_Sept2012.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.
Peyrouse reports on the complexities of combating the drug trade, given corruption in Central Asian states and the porous borders.
RFE/RL. "Russia Said To Block U.S. Drug Plan Amid Wariness Over Central Asian Influence.“ Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 12 Feb. 2012. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_reportedly_blocks_us_plan_central_asia_opium_drugs_narcotics_afghanistan/24488075.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.
The article describes how Russia blocked the US-backed CACI plan, despite wishing for military action by the US in the past.
Standish, Reid. “The Three Evils of Narco-Policy in Central Asia.” Registan. 7 Sep. 2013. <http://registan.net/2013/07/09/the-three-evils-of-narco-policy-in-central-asia/>. 8 Mar. 2014.
Reid's article is a secondary source linking back to UN reports, as well as the rejected Rainbow-2 and CACI plans. It elaborates on international concern for an even greater drug-problem after the US withdrawl.
UNODC. “Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Threat Assessment.” UNODC. United Nations. Pages 23, 68. May 2012. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.
A highly detailed UN report showing how the drug-trade has gotten worse rather than better over the course of the Afghanistan war.
Vatutin, Alexander. “Rainbow-2 Anti-Drug Plan for Afghanistan.” Voice of Russia. 6 Sep. 2011. <http://voiceofrussia.com/2011/09/06/55757403/>. 8 Mar. 2014.
Vatutin's article translates Ivanov's statements on the Rainbow-2 plan, and some of its details.
Weitz, Richard. "Kyrgyzstan: A Look at Central Asia’s Drug War.” Eurasianet. 29 Feb. 2012. <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65066>. 8 Mar. 2014.
Weitz report takes an exclusive look at Kyrgyzstan, detailing what Kyrgyzstan is doing different in its efforts against illegal drug-use along with statistics.
1 Timothy Krambs. “Drug Control in Central Asia.” Foreign Military Studies Office. Pg. 5. U.S. Army. http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/FAO/Drug-Control-Central-Asia.pdf.> 8 Mar. 2014.
2 DrugWarFacts.org. “International – Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Abstracts and statistics from other studies).”Common Sense for Drug Policy. http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/?q=node/1111#sthash.1eYFzkkM.dpbs>. 8 Mar. 2014.
3 DrugWarFacts.org. “International – Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Abstracts and statistics from other studies).”Common Sense for Drug Policy. http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/?q=node/1111#sthash.1eYFzkkM.dpbs>. 8 Mar. 2014.
4 DrugWarFacts.org. “International – Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Abstracts and statistics from other studies).”Common Sense for Drug Policy. http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/?q=node/1111#sthash.1eYFzkkM.dpbs>. 8 Mar. 2014.
5 Richard Weitz. "Kyrgyzstan: A Look at Central Asia’s Drug War.” Eurasianet. 29 Feb. 2012. <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65066>. 8 Mar. 2014.
6 Kairat Osmonaliev. “Developing Counter-Narcotics Policy in Central Asia.” Silk Road Studies. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. January 2005. PDF Pg. 26-28. <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/Silkroadpapers/Osmonaliev.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.
7 Drug War Facts: “Russia.” <http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/?q=node/1245#sthash.vhCrmqVc.dpbs>. 17 Mar. 2014
8 Kairat Osmonaliev. “Developing Counter-Narcotics Policy in Central Asia.” Silk Road Studies. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. January 2005. PDF Pg. 68. <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/Silkroadpapers/Osmonaliev.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.
9 Timothy Krambs. “Drug Control in Central Asia.” Foreign Military Studies Office. Pg. 4. U.S. Army. <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/FAO/Drug-Control-Central-Asia.pdf.> 8 Mar. 2014.
10 Activist Post. “UN Drug Czar: States Can’t Legalize Marijuana Under International Law.” Activist Post. 21 Nov. 2012. <http://www.activistpost.com/2012/11/un-drug-czar-states-cant-legalize.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.
11 Sergej Guneev. “Putin Criticizes States Legalizing Soft Drugs.” RIA-NOVOSTI. 5 Jun. 2013. <http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130605/181522078.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.
12 Sergej Guneev. “Putin Criticizes States Legalizing Soft Drugs.” RIA-NOVOSTI. 5 Jun. 2013. <http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130605/181522078.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.
13 Alexander Vatutin. “Rainbow-2 Anti-Drug Plan for Afghanistan.” Voice of Russia. 6 Sep. 2011. <http://voiceofrussia.com/2011/09/06/55757403/>. 8 Mar. 2014.
14 Fergana International Information Agency. “Viktor Ivanov...“ Ferghana.news. 3 May 2012. <http://enews.fergananews.com/news.php?id=2246>. 8 Mar. 2014.
15 David Brunnstrom. “NATO Rejects Russian Call for Afghan Drug Removal.” Reuters. 24 Mar. 2010. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/24/idUSLDE62N1YZ>. 8 Mar. 2014.
16 RFE/RL. "Russia Said To Block U.S. Drug Plan Amid Wariness Over Central Asian Influence.“ Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 12 Feb. 2012. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_reportedly_blocks_us_plan_central_asia_opium_drugs_narcotics_afghanistan/24488075.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.
17 RFE/RL. "Russia Said To Block U.S. Drug Plan Amid Wariness Over Central Asian Influence.“ Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 12 Feb. 2012. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_reportedly_blocks_us_plan_central_asia_opium_drugs_narcotics_afghanistan/24488075.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.
18 EEAS. “First Eu-Central Asia Security Dialogue…” European Union. 13 June 2013. <http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/14062013_eu_central_asia_secdial_en.htm>. 8 Mar. 2014.
19 T.V. Paul. “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy.” International Security. 2005, 30.1. The MIT Press. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.stetson.edu:2048/stable/4137458>. 8 Mar. 2014.