Bleeding Gagauzia: Foreign Meddling
in an Ethnic Divide
In the increasingly European Union
leaning country Moldova, the autonomous region of Gagauzia leans towards the
opposite direction – its allegiance towards the East, looking at the Russian
Customs Union as essential to its survival whereas Moldova seems more and more
poised towards integration with the EU.[1]
This was not the initial cause of Gagauzia’s asymmetrical autonomy; in the
immediate fall of the Soviet Union, the regions of both Transnistria and
Gagauzia – the latter, almost paradoxical given its rising nationalism – were
opposed to leaving the Union. Unlike Transnistria, however, the Gagauz are not
ethnically Slavic.[2] There are
continued fears of becoming a powerless minority or of becoming assimilated and
losing their cultural heritage in an independent Moldova, especially with the
potential of Moldova and Romania unifying into a single nation state.
The Gagauz make up only 4% of Moldova’s
total population, yet 80% of Gagauzia, numbering around 160,000. A Turkic –
and, interestingly, commonly Christian – people, the Gagauz are significantly
distinct within Moldova.[3]
Even with autonomy, however, the Gagauz have had to endure costs brought on by
Moldova’s association agreement with the European Union; Russian sanctions
against the Moldovan economy directly harmed wine producers in Gagauzia despite
exceptions aimed particularly at Gagauzia, and further closeness could crumble
the already fragile economy.[4]
Despite their Turkic ethnicity and language, most Gagauz speak Russian, and
there are a plethora of Russian language schools. [5]
Once considered an example of a
successful resolution of post-Soviet ethnic conflict, after having achieved
autonomy in 1994 unlike its Transnistrian neighbor which remains a defacto independent state, Gagauzia’s
importance as a geopolitical pressure point is once again apparent. Despite a
guarantee of Gagauzia’s right to self-determination should Moldova’s status as
an independent nation – referring then to the potential for unification with
Romania – in the same 1994 law that granted it autonomy, there now seems to be significant
rhetoric among the elites for secession if it means retaining close ties, or
even closer ties, to Russia.[6]
There is no readily apparent desire for equitable inclusion, and autonomy
itself seems to no longer sate the Gagauz palette – perhaps aggravated by
further Russian meddling in the wake of Euromaidan in Ukraine – despite the
central Moldovan government funding at least half of Gagauzia’s budget.
The question is whether this is a result of a
primordialist difference between Gagauz and Moldovan, or instead an
instrumentalist interest by both Gagauz and Russians in more tangible factors,
with ethnic differences playing only a superficial role. I take a
constructivist approach. I argue that Gagauz nationalism does not fit the traditional
triadic nexus. While there is a genuine nationalizing nation of Gagauz, and a
significant difference between the Gagauz and the Moldovans – a difference
which could be sorely exacerbated in a Moldovan-Romanian unification – the real
source of the ethnic conflict stems from external influence by Russia, which
has an ulterior geopolitical interest in utilizing Gagauzia’s position of autonomy
to sway Moldovan politics towards federalism or limited EU ties – if not Gagauz
secession entirely – rather than a purely ethnic mobilization from within
Gagauzia. I further add that Turkey’s role as an external homeland for the
Gagauz is limited and, to date, not politically relevant outside of language
politics.
Methodology
Primordialist and instrumentalist factors will be
evaluated and considered in this paper as a way of reviewing the legitimacy
behind the Gagauz claim to autonomy, but also understanding the seemingly
paradoxical allegiance to Russia which is ethnically dissimilar. The economy
and language politics play the largest roles in the ethnic conflict, with
external influence from both Turkey and Russia perpetuating separation between
the Moldovans and Gagauz.
Instrumentalist
Factors:
Economy
The dominant Gagauz narrative against
the Moldovan-EU Association Agreement is the potential harm to the Gagauz
economy. A 2014 non-binding resolution, deemed illegal by the Moldovan
authorities but supported by Russia, showed that 98% of Gagauz voters preferred
closer links with Russia’s Eurasian Customs Union, rather than the European
Union.[7]
Wine accounts for 60% of
Gagauzia’s industrial production, and 45% of Gagauz wine exports were sent to
Russia in 2013, while Moldovan wine was banned from export to Russia as a
result of sanctions imposed on Moldova as a warning for the Association
Agreement with the EU. However, many Gagauz wineries were exempt, able to
continue trade with Russia.[8]
Additionally, many Gagauz fear that their products would not be competitive in
the EU market if Moldova – and Gagauzia – were to integrate with the EU, as
well as the possibility for having access to the Russian labor market blocked. [9]
Moldova is the poorest country in
Europe, and Gagauzia is one of its poorest regions.[10]
These high levels of poverty work in Russia’s favor, as has been seen in other
regions pining for Russian dominance. Around 25,000 Gagauz work in Russia as
migrant workers, a significant economic bargaining chip for Russia.[11]
Foreign
Interest
Gagauzia is an important point of
geopolitical pressure for Russia, given its ties to Russia and position in the
Black Sea region. If Gagauzia was to abandon autonomy and become another “frozen conflict” rather than a recognized
independent state, as has been the case with Transnistria, it would severely
complicate Moldovan goals of joining the European Union. The recent referendum
shows that Russia maintains a significant degree of influence in the region.
Russia has acted as an antagonizing
external force in Gagauzia. The latest leader of Gagauzia is a Moscow financed,
pro-Russian governor named Irina Vlah, who ran a decidedly pro-Russian
campaign, such as utilizing a poster showing her under the colors of Russia’s
flag with the motto “Russia is with us” and “Being alongside Russia is within
our strength.”[12] These
mottos were in Russian. [13]
Russian television channels – seen in Gagauzia – gave biased pro-Vlah coverage.
As the new baskhan of Gagauzia, she
stated that Russia is “the guarantor of Moldova's statehood and of the autonomy
of Gagauzia.” [14]
Furthermore, Vlah, unlike her
predecessor Mikhail Formuzal, seems focused on Russia rather than the approach
Formuzal undertook that sought investments from Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.[15]
According to analyst for the Jamestown Foundation, Dumitru Minzarari,
Moscow…
could point to such regional referendums and demand that Chisinau listen to the
popular will… armed with the ‘popular will’ argument, Russia could further
explore it in its negotiations with the United States and the EU, claiming that
the European integration agenda is being imposed on the Moldovan population by
the West.[16]
Analyst
Eric Jones adds,
Gagauzia
is an important, if not very well known, point of pressure in the ongoing
tug-of-war between the West and Russia. Influence campaigns and unforeseen
events have the potential for great impact upon the future of security and
stability in post-Soviet Eastern Europe. Gagauzia’s
geographic location, its ethnic makeup, and its cultural, political, and
economic ties to Russia make this unknown region a potential spark in the
tinderbox of Eastern Europe.[17]
Primordialist
Factors:
Language
Despite the existence and
post-Soviet, perhaps Turkish-assisted resurgence of Gagauz as a language,
Russian remains the dominant language in Gagauzia. Romanian, however, is the
official language of Moldova, and a lack of knowledge in the language severely
complicates employment prospects for Gagauz. Simultaneously, the continued use
of Russian has allowed Gagauz to work as migrants in Russia.
Romanian is utilized primarily by
Gagauz who choose to work in cities such as the Moldovan capital of Chisinau,
as Romanian is the state language. But Gagauz is similar to Turkish, and
Russian is widely spoken – if not moreso than even Gagauz – and these two
languages allow for Gagauz to work in either Turkey or Russia without having to
learn a third language. Additionally, most of the political elite in Gagauzia
are Russian speakers. With Romanian utilized as the state language, and
therefore used in examinations and state jobs, its lack of popularity amongst
the Gagauz keeps them alienated from central Moldovan society. As Esman writes,
Rules
established and enforced by the state determine the goals that ethnic
communities may legitimately pursue and the strategies and tactics they may
employ. State policies regulate access to and enjoyment of such material values
as education, government, and private employment… They govern the use and
status of languages in schools and universities, in public administration, and
in official communication.[18]
Additionally, the lack of
popularity of the Romanian language in Gagauzia is a structural issue in
Russophone media dependence. Russian mass media bias penetrates the Gagauz
media landscape, rebroadcast in Moldova, as Russian is spoken by 73% of the
Gagauz population as a secondary language.[19]
Despite Gagauz being taught as a language in the region, there is no school
that teaches its entire curriculum in Gagauz, and the language of Comrat
University is Russian. This may have political ramifications, such as the wide
support for the Eurasian Customs Union and distrust of the European Union,
according to some analysts.
However, it is ethnic pride that may
play a significant role in resistance to the Romanian language. Beyond the
tangible factors of alternative areas of employment and the difficulty in
learning a third language, to learn Romanian would be to also to overcome the
psychological factor of a different assortment of literature and social
culture.
Nevertheless, there is the feeling
by some Gagauz that Russian plays too important of a role in Gagauz society.
According to Todur Zanet, editor of Ana
Sozu, the Gagauz elite have failed to support the national language.
Our
language isn’t needed… the leaders of Gagauzia do everything they can in order
that the Gagauz language will disappear. Look around, everything is in Russian:
all the websites, all the scandals, all the meetings… in the education law,
there are no plans for the opening of Gagauz schools and kindergartens.[20]
Ethnicity
Unlike the Transnistrians, who are
in large part of Ukrainian and Russian ethnic background, the Gagauz are as
aforementioned of Turkic descent, having settled into the region around 1000
CE. The ethnogenesis of the Gagauz remains uncertain, and the Gagauz being of
Orthodox Christianity has not been a significant cleavage. There are at least
twenty different theories of their origin, but the Seljuk and Steppe hypotheses
remain the most common.[21]
The study of their origin is ultimately beyond the scope of this paper.
Turkey has provided some measure
of support since 1991 to the region, arguably a utilization of soft power. One
aspect of Turkish influence was a change in language politics. Despite a commonly
pro-Russian stance in Gagauzia, there was a decision to change the Gagauz
alphabet from Cyrillic to the Latin script, an alphabet shared with modern
Turkish.[22]
Nevertheless, as aforementioned, the Russian language remains dominant. Turkey
has long acted in the role of an intermediary between Russia and Moldova.
According to Marcin Kosienkowski and William Schreiber, then-Turkish President
Suleyman Demirel “played a decisive role” in the initial Gagauz acceptance of
regional autonomy, as well as making pledges of economic and structural
investments.[23]
“Demirel... repeatedly stressed that the Turkish role in Moldova and Gagauzia
was by no means confrontational to Russia.” [24]Turkey’s
temperance as a third party interest may have prevented a more extreme outcome
in Gagauzia, as was seen in Transnistria. However, it can be argued that
Turkey’s continued role in language politics and ethnic politics may exacerbate
the divide between Moldovans and Gagauz. In 2000, both a representative office
of Gagauzia was opened in Turkey and Gagauz residents no longer required visas
to enter Turkey. Komrat University has partnerships with five Turkish
universities, and Turkey finances the scholarships of around 60 students a year
to study there. [25]
Unlike the European Union, Turkey
has not undertaken policies and actions directly opposed to Russian influence,
however, and so the two interests have yet to directly conflict. Nevertheless,
to use Brubaker’s term, Turkey may be the “external homeland” in the actual
ethnic sense for the Gagauz, but the Gagauz instead see Russia as their true protectorate.[26]
Therefore, the Gagauz may be conflicted between two external homelands with which they share the language of both:
one ethnic, one civic, given their nostalgia for the Soviet Union and attempts
to remain as part of the Union before its breakup. According to Brubaker,
“External national homelands are constructed through political action, not given
by the facts of ethnic demography.”[27]
Cultural
History
According to Ivan Katchanovski, in
his comparison of Gagauz and Crimean Tatar political culture towards Russia,
the Gagauz distaste for the possibility of a Moldovan-Romanian unification is
historically grounded. During the Romanian rule of Moldova from 1918 to 1940
and 1941 to 1944, the Gagauz were not only repressed, but also “one of the
least educated and impoverished groups in Moldova... After Moldova came under
Soviet Rule as a result of World War II, a significant number of Gagauz
benefited from the Soviet policy of mass education and economic development in
the region.” [28]
Although Gagauzia did not exist
with any separate privileges from the Moldovan SSR, Rather than assimilate into
the Moldovan populace, Soviet policy – as Brubaker writes – pervasively
institutionalized nationalism, as the Soviet Union encouraged the Gagauz to
retain their culture or russify rather than merge with the Moldovans after the
Soviet annexation of Bessarabia in 1940.[29]
The Gagauz had legal privileges under both the Russian Empire and the Soviet
Union, in contrast to facing assimilation with the Romanians. This history
works in favor of the current Russian regime, where Moldova’s desire for closer
EU-integration is seen as a potential forte into Romanian unification and
assimilation.
The Turkish State’s interest in
Gagauzia is seemingly a mostly modern phenomena in the wake of the fall of the
Soviet Union. Like Crimea, Gagauzia is part of a region that was a spoil of war
taken from the Ottoman Empire in the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest that resolved the
Russo-Turkish War.[30]
Some analysts believe that Turkey’s soft power plays are slowly usurping Russia
in influence. Whereas its outreach is not yet anti-Russian, in contrast to
outreach to the Crimean Tatars, there is a growing Turkish idea of a “united
Turan, from Chukotka to the Balkans” that looks beyond the religious cleavage
between Islam and Christianity.[31]
Conclusion
The heavy influence of Russia as an
external influence on the Gagauz cannot be overstated, especially in the wake
of increasing closeness between Moldova, Ukraine, and the European Union,
particularly following the Russian seizure of Crimea. Russia has repeatedly
utilized its diaspora in furthering frozen conflicts, but in Gagauzia the
pro-Russian populace is not a diaspora, rather it is ethnically dissimilar. As
aforementioned, even in Gagauzia it is even felt by some that Russia has
coopted use of Gagauz autonomy for its own geopolitical interest, given a lack
of importance of the Gagauz language and therefore diminishment of the culture
– much of the original reason for the initial autonomy.
Economics does indeed play a large
role – if not the dominant role – in the Gagauz desire to remain autonomous and
perhaps even secede from Moldova if it means retaining ties to Russia. There is
little question that the transition to the European Union would be a painful
one, and given the importance of working abroad in Russia for the Gagauz
economy, the Russians hold a significant “stick” coupled with the carrots of
exceptions to their sanctions on Moldovan goods. However, whether economics is
the sole reason for this allegiance
or the continued attachment to the Russian language, rather than opining for
the Soviet past or a renewed quasi-imperial Russian protectorate requires much
more detailed research.
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Rogers. Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge
Unviersity Press: New York, 1996.
Calus,
Kamil. “Gagauzia: Growing Separatism in Moldova?” Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich.
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Luke. “Is Gagauzia Next on Russia’s List?” Al-Jazeera.
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Esman,
Milton. Ethnic Politics. Cornell
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Goble,
Paul. “Growing Turkish Influence Among Gagauz Threatens Russian Interests.” Moldova.Org.
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Goble,
Paul. “Moldova: Gagauz Leaders ‘More Russian than Gagauz.’ EuroMaidan Press. 20 Sep. 2014. <http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/09/20/moldova-gagauz-leaders-more-russian-than-gagauz/>.
Irina
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<http://vlah.md/index.php?do=static&page=predvybornaya-platforma>.
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Eric. “Gagauzia: Strategic Point of Pressure.” Foreign-Intrigue. 31 Mar. 2015. <http://foreign-intrigue.com/2015/03/gagauzia-strategic-point-of-pressure/>.
Karlsson,
Ingmarr. “The Gagauz, a Christian Turkic People.” Hurriyet. 17 Mar. 2006. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-gagauz-a-christian-turkic-people.aspx?pageID=438&n=the-gagauz-a-christian-turkic-people-2006-03-17>.
Katchanovski,
Ivan. “Small Nations but Great Differences: Political Orientations and Cultures
of the Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz.” Europe-Asia
Studies (6 Sep. 2005): 57.6. pp. 890. <http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ivan_Katchanovski/publication/248965160_Small_Nations_but_Great_Differences_Political_Orientations_and_Cultures_of_the_Crimean_Tatars_and_the_Gagauz/links/0c9605225ea57964b4000000.pdf>.
Kohen,
Sami. “Could Moldova’s Gagauzia Repeat Crimea Scenario?” Al-Monitor. 5 June 2014. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/06/moldova-gagauz-secede-crimea-scenario-economy.html>.
Kosienkowski,
Marcin and William Schreiber. Moldova:
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Minzarari,
Dumitru. “The Gagauz Referendum in Moldova: A Russian Political Weapon?” The
Jamestown Foundation. 5 Feb. 2014. <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41922#.VUCGdvlViko>.
Moldovan
Politics. “Gagauz Elections: Is Russia Interfering in Moldova’s Internal
Affairs?” 21 Mar. 2015. <http://moldovanpolitics.com/2015/03/21/gagauz-elections-is-russia-interfering-in-moldovas-internal-affairs/>.
Nationalia.
“Pro-Russian Candidate Wins Gagauz Election, Demands Increased Autonomy from
Moldova.” 24 Mar. 2015. <http://www.nationalia.info/en/news/2109>.
Noonan,
Joshua. “Gagauzia under Russian Pressure.” Silk
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Rinna,
Tony. “Moldova, the EU, and the Gagauzia Issue.” New Eastern Europe. 14 Feb. 2014. <http://neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/1097-moldova-the-eu-and-the-gagauzia-issue>.
Socor,
Vladimir. “Russia Orchestrates Gagauz Election in Moldova, Ponders the Next
Steps.” The Jamestown Foundation. 31 Mar. 2015. <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43724&cHash=b9e211386ad234cc650d69902cae47d5#.VUCG1flViko>.
[1]
Tony Rinna. “Moldova, the EU, and the Gagauzia Issue.” New Eastern Europe.
14 Feb. 2014.
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Joshua Noonan. “Gagauzia Under Russian Pressure.” Silk Road Reporters. 5
Apr. 2015.
[4]
Sami Kohen. “Could Moldova’s Gagauzia Repeat Crimea Scenario?” Al-Monitor. 5 June 2014.
[5]
Kamil Calus. “Gagauzia: Growing Separatism in Moldova?” Osrodek Studiow
Wschodnich. 10 Mar. 2014.
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
Nationalia. “Pro-Russian Candidate Wins Gagauz Election, Demands
Increased Autonomy from Moldova.” 24 Mar. 2015.
[8]
Eric Jones. “Gagauzia: Strategic Point of Pressure.” Foreign-Intrigue.
31 Mar. 2015.
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
Tony Rinna. “Moldova, the EU, and the Gagauzia Issue.” New Eastern Europe.
14 Feb. 2014.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
Ibid.
[13]
Irina Vlah’s Political Platform. <http://vlah.md/index.php?do=static&page=predvybornaya-platforma>.
[14]
Nationalia. “Pro-Russian Candidate Wins Gagauz Election, Demands
Increased Autonomy from Moldova.” 24 Mar. 2015.
[15]
Vladimir Socor. “Russia Orchestrates Gagauz Election in Moldova, Ponders the
Next Steps.” The Jamestown Foundation. 31 Mar. 2015.
[16]
Dumitru Minzarari. “The Gagauz Referendum in Moldova: A Russian Political
Weapon?” The Jamestown Foundation. 5 Feb. 2014.
[17]
Eric Jones. “Gagauzia: Strategic Point of Pressure.” Foreign-Intrigue.
31 Mar. 2015.
[18]
Milton Esman. Ethnic Politics. Cornell
University Press: New York, 1994. pp. 19.
[19]
Moldovan Politics. “Gagauz Elections: Is Russia Interfering in Moldova’s
Internal Affairs?” 21 Mar. 2015.
[20]
Paul Goble. “Moldova: Gagauz Leaders ‘more Russian than Gagauz.’ EuroMaidan
Press. 20 Sep. 2014.
[21]
Ingmar Karlsson. “The Gagauz, a Christian Turkic People.” Hurriyet. 17 Mar. 2006.
[22]
Paul Goble. “Growing Turkish Influence Among Gagauz Threatens Russian
Interests.” Moldova.Org. 23 Dec. 2010.
[23]
Marcin Kosienkowski and William Schreiber. Moldova:
Arena of International Influences. pp. 208.
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
Paul Goble. “Growing Turkish Influence Among Gagauz Threatens Russian
Interests.” Moldova.Org. 23 Dec. 2010.
[26]
Rogers Brubaker. Nationalism Reframed.
Cambridge Unviersity Press: New York, 1996. pp. 5.
[27]
Rogers Brubaker. Nationalism Reframed.
Cambridge Unviersity Press: New York, 1996. pp 58
[28]
Ivan Katchanovski. “Small
Nations but Great Differences: Political Orientations and Cultures of the
Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz.” Europe-Asia
Studies (6 Sep. 2005): 57.6. pp. 890.
[29]
Rogers Brubaker. Nationalism Reframed.
Cambridge Unviersity Press: New York, 1996. pp. 26.
[30]
Luke Coffey. “Is Gagauzia Next on Russia’s List?” Al-Jazeera. 21 Mar. 2015.
[31]
Paul Goble. “Growing Turkish Influence Among Gagauz Threatens Russian
Interests.” Moldova.Org. 23 Dec. 2010.
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