SRAS/NovaMova
6
May 2014
Policy Brief: The Post Euromaidan EU Approach to the
Ukrainian Far-Right
Executive Summary:
The political situation in Ukraine
has dramatically changed after the ouster of Yanukovich. This requires a
re-evaluation of the European Union's approach towards the new government –
particularly, if radical elements are truly increasing in strength. The dominant
dialogue from the Russian government has been to accuse the interim Ukrainian
government as being composed of, in President Putin's words, “Nationalists,
neo-Nazis, russophobes and anti-Semites”.
While
the Euromaidan movement initially began in response to the refusal of the
Yanukovich government to sign the European Association agreement, it later
evolved into a much more multifaceted movement discontent with the corruption
and unaccountability of the government. Other groups that did not necessarily
support EU affiliation joined in, and the movement became much larger. The idea
that these far-right groups, whose views are fundamentally incompatible with
European Union ideals, are puppets of the EU is patently absurd.
During
the initial period, Russian media criticized the Euromaidan movement of being
composed of the far-left, rather than the far-right, even calling it
“Gayeuromaidan”. When this tactic failed, and when groups affiliated with the
Right Sector name entered the protests, the Russian media and government
quickly changed tactics. The resulting information war has reinvigorated fears
of the Ukrainian far-right, but how accurate these fears are is debatable.
The
truth of the matter is that Euromaidan was not “co-opted” by “fascists” per se,
even at the height of the nationalist involvement. Although Svoboda played a
significant role, along with Right Sector affiliated groups manning barricades,
many of those affiliated with either movement do not actually support the more
extreme sentiments of their respective affiliations.
Furthermore,
Euromaidan was an incredibly diverse movement, composed of groups from all
across the political spectrum. Far-left anarchists, even from Russia, came to
assist their Ukrainian left-wing allies. Pro-European youth movements initiated
the protests, protected by veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War. Feminist and LGBT
groups became paramilitary groups putting up barricade. And, as uncomfortable
as it to admit, nationalist elements did play a significant although by no
means majority role in Euromaidan. This was a unified movement against
Yanukovich.
Now
with Yanukovich gone, the right-wing party Svoboda temporary holds a handful of
executive positions in the interim government – which, even in countries such
as Greece, the far-right has not held executive positions. The European Union
has a desire to take Ukraine as a member, and Ukraine is seemingly on this
path. Neither Svoboda nor Right Sector has supported this idea, instead being
further focused on the idea of a culturally and economically independent
Ukraine – something that is not likely to happen.
However,
both Svoboda and Right Sector are much more against Russian influence than
European – contrariwise to far-right groups in EU member states. Still, the
European Union has no greater existential threat than the far-right. Far-right
and fascist affiliated parties regularly earn around 4 to 10% of the vote in
several EU member states, such as the NDP in Germany and Golden Dawn in Greece.
Therefore, the strength and influence of the far-right in Ukraine must be
assessed. In addition, the history of the movement deserves examination.
The Issue:
What has been the past and what will be
the future roles of the far-right in Ukraine, and how should the European Union
respond?
Background:
Svoboda
Populism and Nationalism, questionable Fascism
Officially, Svoboda's positions are
presently not to the far-right. Despite this, rhetoric and symbolism is not
necessarily in line with its official positions. Although initially much more
extreme, Svoboda has made efforts at “mainstreaming” in recent years. Svoboda
was originally known as the Social-National Party of Ukraine, and was
particularly opposed to communist ideology during the 1990s. Its growth is most
likely due to being a new “opposition party”, one that was allowed to exist
with a fair amount of impunity as Yanukovich clamped down on democracy,
particularly with the more centrist parties.
Although
perhaps not “controlled opposition”, Svoboda's support flourished. It was a
convenient excuse for Yanukovich: the question of who would people prefer, his
government or the “hooligans” of Svoboda? Now, without Yanukovich, some of its
support can be expected to wane with more moderate voices, and the release of
Tymoshenko and her Fatherland Party's influence returning.
Symbolically,
Svoboda's use of the wolfsangel has been a source of controversy.
Svoboda typically makes two claims about the symbol: one, is that it is a
historically Ukrainian symbol. The other is that it stands for the
“Idea-Nation” (Idea-Natsii) concept of a Ukrainian ethnocracy. Nevertheless,
although the symbol bears artificial similarity to the Norse eihwaz rune
and was often used in medieval – primarily German – coats of arms, it was most
recently used by units of the Waffen SS and the failed Nazi Werwulf insurgency.
Anecdotal
evidence through interviews in Maidan before Yanukovich's ultimate ousting
revealed that some Ukrainians readily reject the association of the symbol with
neo-Nazism, even if they are not supporters of Svoboda. 
Although
Svoboda officially dropped the symbol, altogether uncommon to see it
spraypainted in Kyiv or Odesa, along with being worn as an armband by
Euromaidan protestors. This may be because a small group known as the Patriots
of Ukraine, which ended affiliation with Svoboda in 2007 but is now affiliated
with the Right Sector movement, also uses the logo.
In
addition, anti-Semitic rhetoric from the early years has continuously haunted
Svoboda's image, despite a lack of evidence of anti-Jewish attacks or violence,
although it does not take much for rhetoric to escalate into action. Svoboda
leader Oleh Tyahnybok once said that Kyiv was governed by a “Jewish-Russian
mafia”, and the European Parliament has censured Svoboda as recently as 2012,
condemning them as “racist, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic.” In addition, the EU
Parliament warned “pro-Democratic parties... not to
associate with, endorse or form coalitions with this party.”
Nevertheless,
there are reports of IDF veterans working with Svoboda in Euromaidan, such as
the “Blue Helmets” organization. Furthermore, although the international Jewish
community has typically censured Svoboda or criticized it, the domestic feeling
by the Jewish community is significantly different – they certainly do not
embrace Svoboda, but nor do they fear them as an impending oppressor.
Svoboda's
actual positions seem much closer to populism than open fascism. A brief glance
through their website reveals no further fascistic symbolism, and their issued
statements revolve around Ukrainian independence from both European and Russian
influence, along with “middle class issues.”
Even
some informal statements echo the old “Idea Nation” concept with an idea of a
Ukrainian ethnocracy, similar – in their idea – to Israel. Even according to Oleksander
Aronets, who recently filmed the beating of a TV network worker by Svoboda
members for showing the Moscow celebrations relevant to Crimea, “They [the
Jews] had a Holocaust, we had a holodomor” – speaking about Stalin’s forced
starvation of millions of Ukrainians. “They were without their own country. And
then when they formed a country, Israel… They brought back their own language.
We have problems [maintaining] our language. They brought back their laws,
their traditions.”
Although
they have significant connections to other European far-right parties, they do
not openly display the neo-Nazi extremism that certain elements of the much
smaller and much less organized Right Sector does. Although there are not
readily available statistics, interviews show that many Svoboda members are not
in agreement with some of the harsher rhetoric, nor often times some of
Svoboda's positions.
Furthermore,
Svoboda's influence is greatly exaggerated. For example, in the 2012 parliament
elections, they won 10% of the vote. Furthermore, they have joined with the
much more supported Batkivshchyna and UDAR parties as part of a coalition.
Still, the presence of a handful of Svoboda members in the interim executive,
widely controversial, is not indicative of their future influence, and most
signs point to the party slowly becoming less neofascistic, although retaining
nationalist roots.
Right Sector – A Banner, not an Organization:
Right Sector has recently usurped
Svoboda's position as an extreme-right movement in the minds and eyes of many.
The question that is rarely asked and even rarer answered is: who is Right
Sector? Right Sector's influence at Maidan was estimated to only be around
2,500 members, although Right Sector claims 5,000 to 10,000. Even at Maidan,
statistically their influence was marginal the total number of people at Maidan
regularly was between 400,000 and 800,000. In addition, left-wing groups easily
dwarfed Right Sector's presence in terms of members.
"The Right Sector is marginal," according to Andreas
Umland, assistant professor of European studies at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, who
studies nationalist groups. "It's an umbrella organization of extra
parliamentary lunatic fringe groups that has now come to this big prominence largely
because of the media... Its importance is certainly overstated."
However,
it is Right Sector's organization that is the source of its strength. Right
Sector manned many of the barricades at Maidan, providing almost paramilitary
security. Still Right Sector, until after Yanukovich's ousting, had virtually
no “official” political presence, although a party has recently been formed by
the same name. It is much too early to determine the relevance of such a party.
Although the violence of Right Sector affiliates should not be understated,
they too are insignificant in the “bigger picture” of the political landscape.
Right
Sector is viewed by many western analysts as a more fascistic, more radical
counterpart to Svoboda. However, Right Sector's “leader”, Dmytro Yarosh, who
also leads the Right Sector affiliated group “Trident of Stepan Bandera” denies
this, saying instead that Right Sector is undoubtedly nationalist but not
racist, and that Svoboda is far more intolerant. Yarosh even met with Israeli ambassador
Reuven Din El, stating that he was not a supporter of antisemitism.
Later,
Right Sector ousted the “White Hammer” movement from its banner for its
neo-fascist leanings. Yarosh also told the “Pravda” news paper that, despite
sharing some political beliefs with other far-right parties, he did not share
in their racism – including that, allegedly, of Svoboda.
Statement of Interest:
As aforementioned, the European
Union has no greater internal political-existential threat than the far-right.
Even without the presence of a radical right-wing, Ukraine has a difficult road
ahead of it in order to meet the standards necessary to one day become a
European Union member. Even not considering membership, the situation requires
monitoring from a human rights standpoint.
The
right-wing must be watched, monitored, and radical policies either censured or
punished. However, policy recommendations must be made with the realistic
understanding of the political climate. Svoboda, and even Right Sector, are not
the same as Greece's Golden Dawn. Bringing the conservative Ukrainian zeitgeist
closer to European values must be done cautiously, as to not aggravate and
increase the influence of the far-right.
Previous Policies:
Isolation and
Censuring
The European Union has previously approached both Right Sector and
Svoboda with a policy of marginalization; that is to say, officials have often
issued censuring statements and excluded them from particular organizations, as
recently as 2012. In cases of the far-right parties of European Union member
states, the policy has been similar; however, often times the governments of
those countries have tried to repress the far-right with varying degrees of
success, such as the German government's attempts at banning the NDP.
Euromaidan
During
Euromaidan, the European Union did not make particular statements for or
against the right-wing in Ukraine. This was perhaps to avoid lending credence
to the anti-Euromaidan arguments poised by the Russian government, and because
the situation was rapidly changing on the ground.
Policy Options:
Return to Isolation
Continue the policy of
marginalization of the far-right, including Svoboda. Work with the Ukrainian
government to actively oppose them in a democratic fashion.
Pros:
1.
Follows similar trends in EU member states.
2.
Shows that the EU is opposed to the far-right.
3.
Works against the Russian argument that the new
Ukrainian government is dominated by the far-right.
Cons:
1.
Runs the risk of seeming “meddlesome.”
2.
Could still be used by the Russian government as
an example of a domineering EU.
3.
Likely to actually encourage continued
radicalization, rather than moderation.
Status Quo
Bide time – do not make “official”
statements or take positions on Svoboda or Right Sector until further down the
road. The interim government in Ukraine is still weak, and taking a role too
early may further destabilize the situation.
Pros:
1.
Allows for more objectivity and neutrality for
better analyzation.
2.
Does not run the risk of inadvertently creating
bigger problems.
Cons:
1.
Easily exploitable by Russian propaganda.
2.
May make the EU seem “weak” on the far-right.
Rapprochement
Recognize, if the trend holds, that
Svoboda is evolving into a more moderate force. Also watch Right Sector as it
too disassociates from the more neofascist groups associated with it.
Pros:
1.
Both organizations do seem to be on a path to
moderation in “official” terms.
2.
Rapprochement may actually accelerate their
moderation.
Cons:
1.
Easily exploitable by Russian propaganda as a
“far-right friendly EU.”
2.
Rapprochement may strengthen them without
moderation as a result.
3.
Despite the apparent track to moderation, neither
Svoboda nor Right Sector are particularly friendly to the EU, and have close
ties with other far-right parties and anti-EU parties such as the UK
Independence Party.
Recommendation:
A “carrots and sticks” approach incorporating
elements of both censuring and rapprochement.
Svoboda and Right Sector both
currently hold close ties to other far-right groups in the European political
sphere. They cannot be ignored, but they also cannot be viewed in the same
light as their counterparts – it may be an opportune time to influence Svoboda
and Right Sector as well, given that their extremist counterparts in EU member
states have often spoken in support of Putin. Certainly, their influence and
extremity is exaggerated, but it exists.
Ukrainian
nationalism, even Right Sector's “ethnocratic” ideas that are, in the long run,
incompatible with certain European Union ideals. However, this is not to say
that they are on the same level as the Golden Dawn movement in Greece.
Still,
the European Union cannot sit idly by in the rapidly developing situation in
Ukraine if human rights are being violated. It is important, however, that the
European Union not act too hastily. The interim government in Ukraine cannot
repeat the past mistakes of political oppression, but in the same token it
cannot allow for violent antisemitism. Furthermore, the role the European Union
can play is limited by both the tenuous political situation and the fact that
Ukraine is not, as of yet, a member of the EU.
Ultimately,
Svoboda and Right Sector are not the “cause” inasmuch as the symptoms. Neither
are “puppet parties” although their activity may have been convenient at times
for more powerful factions. Neither are they “merely” neo-fascist groups. They
are symptoms: the result of an extreme version of the increasing desire for a
Ukrainian identity, but manifested as right-wing and anti-liberal
organizations. Although the symptoms merit treatment, the causes must also be
addressed.
Sources
Consulted:
Danilova, Maria. “After Ukraine Protest, Radical Group Eyes Power.” Associated
Press. 14 Mar. 2014. <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/after-ukraine-protest-radical-group-eyes-power>.
6 May 2014.
An article on the
political ambitions of Dmytro Yarosh and Right Sector, along with its
organization during Euromaidan, as well as Jews serving side by side with Right
Sector. Furthermore, Andriy Tarasenko – a Right Sector spokesman – speaks out
against the ideas of Right Sector being associated with neo-Nazism, although
embraces the ethnocracy idea.
“Israeli Envoy Opens 'Hotline' with Ukrainian Ultra-Nationalist.” Haaretz.
7 Mar. 2014. <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.578537>. 6
May. 2014.
This article
references Svoboda's past use of anti-Semitic slurs, along with Dmitry Yarosh's
meeting with Israeli ambassador Din El, and Yarosh's disavowal of racism.
Motyl, Alexander J. “Ukraine's Chief Rabbi Refutes Putin's
Anti-Semitic Charges.” World Affairs Journal. 5 Mar. 2014.
<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/ukraines-chief-rabbi-refutes-putins-anti-semitic-charges>.
Accessed 6 May 2014.
Op-ed by Alexander
Motyl, Rutgers University professor political science, on Rabbi Yaakov Dov
Bleich accusing Russia of staging anti-Semitic provocations and the
“Russians... blowing this way, way out of proportion” with regards to
anti-Semitism by nationalist factions.
Motyl, Alexander J. “'Experts' On Ukraine.” World Affairs Journal.
5 Mar. 2014.
<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/experts-ukraine>.
Accessed 6 May. 2014.
After criticizing
other commentators, Motyl goes into extreme detail on Svoboda's more populist
positions here, staying that despite the extreme right-wing nature of Right
Sector and Svoboda that they are not neofascist and not “dominating” the
post-Yanukovich government.
Olszanski, Tadeusz. “Svoboda Party – The New Phenomenon on the
Ukrainian Right-Wing Scene.” The International Relations and Security
Network: Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) Warsaw, Poland. 4 July 2011.
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=137051>.
6 May. 2014.
This article
describes the use of the wolfsangel by Svoboda, and the “Idea-Natsii”
ethnocracy concept, along with the potential causes for Svoboda's growth,
arguing against the idea of it as merely a “puppet party” or a neo-Nazi party.
“Open Letter of Ukrainian Jews to Russian Federation President
Vladimir Putin.” 5 Mar. 2014.
<http://maidantranslations.com/2014/03/05/open-letter-of-ukrainian-jews-to-russian-federation-president-vladimir-putin/>.
6 May 2014.
An open letter by
various Jewish representatives to Putin stating the problem of “Fascism” is
overblown, and even in the case of “Bandera followers” they do not show blatant
xenophobia or anti-Semitism.
Stern, David. “Svoboda: The Rise of Ukraine's
Ultra-Nationalists.” BBC News. 26
Dec. 2012. <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20824693>. 6 May 2014.
A brief article
describing the aftermath of the 2012 parliamentary elections, and the possible
motivations for their support, including evidence of potential anti-Semitism
along with denials by Svoboda members of anti-Semitism.
“Ukraine: Report From a Visit in Kiev in April
2014.” Tahrir-ICN. 30 Apr. 2014.
<http://tahriricn.wordpress.com/2014/04/30/ukraine-report-from-a-visit-in-kiev-in-april-2014/>.
6 May 2014.
A collective news report from an anonymous
anarchist who operated with left-wing groups in Maidan such as Left Oppositon,
Student Direct Action, and Autonomous Workers' Union.
Umlaud, Andreas. “The Rise of the Radical Right in Ukraine.” KyivPost.
21 Oct. 2010. <https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/the-rise-of-the-radical-right-in-ukraine-87119.html?flavour=mobile>.
6 May. 2014.
A brief opinion piece
describing the use of the wolfsangel by Svoboda, and its increasing trend
towards moderacy.
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