The
aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse left an ideological vacuum
in Russia. The move was at first towards the west – an unreceptive
and unenthusiastic host. It did not take long for such a move to
fail. The difference in important systems of thought in Russian
foreign policy can be readily examined by their approach to the West.
Tsygankov labels these systems as follows: the Westernists, pushing
for closer relations and the adoption of values with and of the West
– though their definition of “West” differs; the
Civilizationists, who wish for a nationalist and Stalinist state in
Russia, or a Eurasian union completely independent from the West;
lastly, the Statists, who take elements from both preceding systems
while pushing for a very realist balance of power and desire a
multipolar world (62).
Westernists
have their roots in the “New Thinking” of Gorbachev. Gorbachev
followed a pattern of liberalism blinded by idealism. His policy of
reform was ultimately painted with a negative legacy – to readily
gave in to withdrawals and concessions, all with the futile goal of
western acceptance (50). With Gorbachev's vast efforts at decreasing
military tension between the Soviet Union and the West, there was a
genuine hope for turning attention towards domestic affairs –
perhaps even with the assistance of the West. Gorbachev, however,
found himself essentially used by Western powers; in pushing for
liberalism, he essentially gave up the power that would have acted as
his rock (51). Although its roots were within Gorbachev's New
Thinking, Kozryev's liberal Westernists viewed Gorbachev's failure as
a systemic one (56). Gorbachev was buying oats for a dead horse; no
amount of concessions and reforms could save the utopian Soviet Union
from extinction. Based in part on liberalist ideas such as Fukiyama's
“the end of history”, the liberalist Westernists saw Russia's
future as becoming entwined with the West, both economically and
politically (56). For the first few years after the Soviet Union,
they were the dominant force. Alternatively, the Social Democrats –
also considered Westernisers – held to Gorbachev's teachings. The
Social Democrats viewed pure the liberal Westernists focus as
undermining Russia's potential for social democracy – there was too
much of a focus on the US, rather than the European powers and
perhaps the world as a whole (64). Nevertheless, in 1993,
westernization as a whole was on the way out (67). Like before, the
West essentially turned its attention away from Russia; the aid it
did give was not up to expectations (67). In spite of liberalist
Westernists pushing for closer relations with the West, rather than
their own neighboring former Soviet republics, the West forgot about
Russia. Despite attempts at integrating with western organizations
such as the International Monetary Fund, the failure on the West's
part to helpfully engage a ready and willing Russia had left Russia
to its fate, and a rapidly decaying moral and economic fabric offered
itself as fertile breeding grounds for nationalism, much like the
Weimar Republic of Germany had. Today, Westernists remain a critical
voice of the other systems (205). They criticize Civilizationists and
Statists of being too focused on narrow-minded balancing with the US,
rather than focusing on non-western powers like China (206).
The
Civilizationists are the old guard. Much like the Westernists,
Tsygankov places the Civilizationists in two groups – the National
Communists, and the Hard-line Eurasianists. He uses Gennadi Zyuganov
to represent the National Communist ideology, which is based in the
neo-nationalism that arose in the ashes of the Soviet Union (61, 63).
Coupling nationalism with communism, they wish a restoration of
Soviet Russia – socialism in one country. National Communists,
particularly Zyuganov who remains the head of the Communist Party of
the Russian Federation. They are dramatically opposed to
westernization, going as far to accuse Westernists of being traitors,
as they see the influence as merely undermining Russian influence in
the world (63). The second group of Civilizationists are the
Hard-line Eurasianists. The Eurasianists wish to stand opposed to the
US' interests, which they view as inherently incompatible with Russia
(63). The Eurasianists hold very real geopolitical ambitions – that
of a “Greater Russia”, but their influence is little (63). The
Eurasianists flirt with fascism, especially individuals like Vladimir
Zhirinovsky, and they have been used as examples of radical bogeymen
(Laparenok). The Civilizationists radically oppose integration with
western organizations, as well as western influence, seeing
themselves as either independent or having farm ore in common with
the East.
The
dominant influence in Russia, however, belongs to the Statists. The
Statists are viewed by many to be the pragmatists, rather than the
ideologues of the Westernists and the Civilizationists, though they
take lessons from both camps (64) The Statists view Russia as unique,
with its own objective national interests independent of the rest of
the world. With the rejection of westernism came Kozyrev's removal,
and the installation of Primakov, as foreign minister under Boris
Yeltsin in 1995 (65). Under Primakov, Yeltsin's administration turned
from idealism, to realism – to securing its own interests (96).
While Russia did not retreat into isolationism, it simultaneously
pursued a more international foreign policy rather than simply
ignoring non-western powers as the Westerinizers had (97). The
Statist method also incorporated certain terminology and concepts
from the Civilizationists, such as Russia as a sovereign power with
roots in Eurasia, without playing into imperialist dogma (97). The
Statists opposed what they perceived to be encroachment by the West
on their power, especially with regards to NATO expansion (Tsygnakov
94). If the Statist way of thinking could be summed up in one word,
it would be realism – contrasting the different strains of idealism
of both the Civilizationists and the Westernists. There is a sort of
middle ground in the Statist approach to the West; instead of the
anti-hedgemon, Russia simply “is” in the Statist worldview (95).
It does not bend to American whims, nor does it necessarily oppose
them for the sake of being contrarian. One key element of Primakov's
ideas that differed from both was the reintegration of former Soviet
territories, something that was incredibly draining on Russia's
health (121). Primakov would soon abandon this policy of a
closer-knit CIS. One may argue that Putin's continuation policies of
“Great Power Pragmatism” are a direct continuation of Statism's
“Great Power Balancing” – yet with pragmatic and adaptive
shifts. Statism has been the dominant weltanschauung behind Russian
foreign policy for more than a decade, regardless of brief
Westernist-Statist hybridization post 9-11. Putin wishes for Russia
to have a strong, independent, and paternalistic state, and he has
readily pursued aggressive foreign policy to achieve this end. There
is no settling for the status of a “middle” power in Putin's
world – Russia must be a great power. The West may be engaged, but
western democratization may be nothing more at times than a sham for
cloaked imperialism
While
to come extent any labeling of diverse thought into neatly packaged
constructs is a gross oversimplification, it does provide a useful
method of making complicated ideas more understandable. The
Westernists wait, seeing the impending conflict between China and
Russia as their new chance as Russia retains and builds its status as
a great power. One cannot help but believe that there may still be
some resentment on the part of the liberals for the failure of the US
to seize the moment in which it could have allied itself further with
Russia. The Social Democrats had looked to Western Europe longingly,
though now face the sight of watching forces ebb and flow within the
financially tumultuous European Union. The Civilizationists remain
the nationalistic bogeymen, with much of their talk of Russia as a
Great Power readily co-opted by the Statists. They no longer hold the
sway they once did as being the “anti-Westernists”, though now
they present themselves as an alternative to what they claim is the
corrupt Statist methodology of Putin. The Statists continue to
dominate, though perhaps not in the same ways that the Primakovites
had hoped. The differing approaches to the West will continue to be
how the systems of thought differentiate between themselves.
Works
Cited
Laparenok,
Leonid. “Vladimir Zhirinovsky.” Russiapedia,
by Russia Today.
Web.
<http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/politics-and-society/vladimir-zhirinovsky/>.
19 Nov. 2012.
Tsygankov,
Andrei P. Russia's
Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity.
2nd ed. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010. Print.
No comments:
Post a Comment