Peter
Durnovo wrote to Tsar Nicholas II in February of 1914 a memorandum
warning
of the consequences of war,
mere months before the onset of the first World War. Tensions were
brewing. Franz Ferdinand had not yet been assassinated, but there was
a deep sense of growing unrest. Only a
decade
earlier, Russia had experienced a failed revolution after the
Russo-Japanese War (Steinberg).
Durnovo, a reactionary determined to keep the status quo, recognized
the risks of what a war would bring and how it would sever the last
threads holding Imperial Russia together. He blasted the Triple
Entente as having been meddled in by Britain, and that Russia had
pragmatically gained nothing as a result – but could lose
everything, as the battering ram of Britain. “To
sum up, the Anglo-Russian accord has brought us nothing of practical
value up to this time, while for the future, it threatens us with an
inevitable armed clash with Germany.”
Many of his warnings eerily came true, down to Russia's inadequacy to
fight a war on the side of Britain, to how the socialists would rise
up in the smoke, to the fall of Germany (Steinberg).
There is one glaring error in Durnovo's memorandum: the mistaken
belief that naval and imperial tensions between Britain and Germany
would be the primary
cause of a greater European war. While
“the Great War” did occur, its origins and onset were not as
Durnovo envisioned.
To fully understand how Durnovo made this poor call, in the face of
being so right on so much, one must examine not only why, but how he
was wrong.
Durnovo
wrongly states that “The
vital interests of Russia and Germany do not conflict.”
History tells us a different story. Germany pursuing
an aggressive
policy for years, perhaps even making realistic plans 18 months in
advance of
the onset of World War I for military action
(Sheffield).
Kaiser Wilhelm II had deliberately decided against renewing a treaty
with Russia years in the 1890s, and instead opted for the creation of
a purely German alliance – this key factor had been the cause of
the first entente, an alliance between Russia and France. Britain,
fearing a powerful Germany, would later engage in mending relations
with France and Russia, dividing the powers into those of the Central
and the Entente. Durnovo
neglects to bring up the fact that Germany, by proxy through its
support of Austria-Hungary, was pursuing a more aggressive policy in
the Balkans as well. Russia, through its alliance with Serbia, stood
in the way (Steinberg).
It
would be Germany that played
the part of aggressor, not Britain (Sheffield).
While
Durnovo was right that the growing imperialist ambitions, along with
military buildup, would increase tension, his prediction was
ultimately wrong. The entangled web of alliances, mutual defense,
treaties, and severe foreign policy miscalculations would be the
brush. The
spark would be
the assassination of Franz Ferdinand –
not a
war between Britain and Germany spilling over. The
assassination of
the heir
to the Austrian throne was blamed squarely on Serbia. Russia, bound
by alliance and treaty, announced the mobilization of its forces
(Kubilius).
Germany, which had written as essentially blank heck to
Austria-Hungary, had perhaps not anticipated that Russia would go
this far. Nevertheless, they had encouraged the concept of war, and
readily declared war on Russia with the view that mobilization was an
act of war. France, allied to Russia, would also be engaged at war –
Germany would invade the neutral Belgium in order to reach Paris
quickly (Sheffield).
Britain, which was morally obligated to defend France per treaty,
would also utilize a nearly century old treaty with Belgium to
justify its involvement after Germany's invasion. Germany's
rampant aggression directly conflicts with Durnovo's predictions, who
had warned that Britain would play the part of antagonist, and would
exploit Russia as a battering ram. “The main burden of the war will
undoubtedly fall on us... The part of a battering ram, making a
breach in the very thick of the German defense, will be ours, with
many factors against us to which we shall have to devote great effort
and attention.”
Durnovo
either failed to include or intentionally omitted the potential
idiocy of Russia's own decision making in his memorandum. The
decision to mobilize the military in the face of Germany's blank
check to Austria-Hungary was foolish, regardless if it was backed by
treaty. Without Nicholas' decision to support Serbia, World War I
almost certainly would not have happened – at least, not the way
that it did. The alternative would have been to remain idle,
abandoning Serbia to Austria. While this would have resulted in
incredible criticism from Pan-Slavicists, it would have permitted
Russia to at the very least have more time in building its forces.
Even the most optimistic predictions stated that Russia would not be
ready for war until 1917 (Sheffield).
One
explanation for Durnovo's insistence to the Tsar that better
relations with Germany were preferable is Durnovo's belief that
Britain was a natural ally of the socialist opposition within Russia.
“Strange as it may seem, England, monarchistic and conservative to
the marrow at home, has in her foreign relations always acted as the
protector of the most demagogical tendencies, in variably encouraging
all popular movements aiming at the weakening of the monarchical
principle.” As a reactionary, Durnovo was doubtlessly terrified by
the idea of the monarchy falling. It was only rational, then, that
Russia should ally with Germany, to which it was ideologically
closer. “It should not be forgotten that Russia and Germany are the
representatives of the conservative principle in the civilized world,
as opposed to the democratic principle, incarnated in England and, to
an infinitely lesser degree, in France.” Whatever Durnovo's
idealization of the German monarchy, it would be the conflict of
Germany and Russia over Austria-Hungary and Serbia that was the first
sign that war was now inevitable.
Durnovo
was wrong that war was an entirely British prospect. He was wrong
that a war between Britain and Germany would pull its allies in –
instead, the opposite happened. It is unlikely that even if Russia
had heeded Durnovo's advice that war could have been avoided for too
long. The end of monarchism may have been inevitable. Ultimately,
Durnovo's warnings would not be heeded. While World War I did not
start the way he had envisioned, the difficulties Russia would face
both during and after the war came true. World War I would accelerate
the end of the Russian Tsardom. The Socialists would be victorious in
Russia, and monarchism would come to a crashing end. Durnovo would
not live to see the end of the monarchy, dying in 1915 – not long
after his warnings.
Sources cited:
Durnovo, Peter.
“Memorandum to Tsar Nicholas II.” Course Material; Provided
Reading.
Kubilius,
Kerry. “Russia's Position in WWI.” Web.
[http://suite101.com/article/russias_position_in_wwi-a71574],
accessed October 30th, 2012.
Sheffield,
Gary. “The Origins of World War One.” Web.
[http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/origins_01.shtml],
accessed October 30th, 2012.
Steinberg,
John, Anthony Heywood, David McDonald. “Could Russia Have Avoided
War in 1914?” Web.
[http://russiasgreatwar.org/media/international/avoided.shtml],
accessed October 30th, 2012.
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